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I cannot reject that skilled players equalize marginal benefit and marginal cost across different time controls. I test this assumption by comparing attention’s marginal benefit (better actions) and marginal cost (less time for future decisions) using millions of online chess moves. Models of rational inattention allow agents to make mistakes in their actions while assuming they do not make mistakes in attention allocation.

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